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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Troy Dewayne Payne appeals from the judgment entered upon his 
conviction by a jury of possession of a controlled substance. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
Payne showed up at Police Captain Barclay's home and handed him a 
package containing methamphetamine. (Tr., p. 109, L. 20 - p. 113, L. 13; p. 168, 
L. 20 - p. 169, L. 2; State's Exhibits 100-04.) The state charged Payne with 
possession of methamphetamine. (R., pp. 13-14.) Payne pied not guilty to the 
charge and the case was set for a jury trial. (R., pp. 17-18, 32.) On the first day 
of trial, the state made an oral motion in limine asserting that if Payne did choose 
to testify, testimony about his motives for possessing the methamphetamine 
would be irrelevant. (Tr., p. 77, L. 7 - p. 78, L. 11.) The defense response was 
that the motion was untimely and that any objection should wait until the 
testimony was offered. (Tr., p. 78, L. 16 - p. 79, L. 5; Tr., p. 80, Ls. 2-6.) 
The district court reserved ruling until during the trial. (Tr., p. 80, Ls. 7-23; p. 81, 
Ls. 9-14.) 
The next morning the parties again touched on the admissibility of 
testimony of Payne's motive for possessing methamphetamine in the context of 
what could be said in opening statements. (Tr., p. 83, L. 20 - p. 84, L. 4.) The 
prosecution argued that the evidence was irrelevant under Idaho Rules of 
Evidence 401 and 402 because the only intent associated with the crime was 
knowing intent to possess and that possession with intent to turn the 
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methamphetamine over to police was not associated with any asserted defense. 
(Tr., p. 84, L. 5 - p. 85, L. 4.) Payne's counsel responded that the evidence 
would show that Payne "did not intend to possess [the methamphetamine]; that 
he intended to get it to law enforcement by the quickest means possible." (Tr., p. 
85, Ls. 7-22.) The district court expressed doubt that desire to get the 
methamphetamine "off the street" was a defense, and tentatively ruled that the 
defense would have to show that the evidence went to a legal justification for the 
possession. (Tr., p. 85, L. 23 - p. 86, L. 19.) The defense then gave an offer of 
proof that Payne would testify he was given methamphetamine without his 
consent to pay off a debt, he did not want the methamphetamine, and that he 
decided to take it straight to the police. (Tr., p. 86, L. 24 - p. 87, L. 8.) The 
evidence would, according to the defense, indicate no intent to possess. (Tr., p. 
87, Ls. 9-12.) The district court perceived a difference between someone calling 
the police to notify them of methamphetamine and taking possession and 
transporting methamphetamine to the police. (Tr., p. 87, L. 24 - p. 88, L. 3.) The 
court denied the motion in limine at that time, but without prejudice. (Tr., p. 89, L. 
21 - p. 90, L. 4; p. 91, Ls. 7-17.) 
After the state presented its evidence, the district court held a jury 
instruction conference in which the parties expressed no objection to the jury 
instructions. (Tr., p. 179, L. 24 - p. 180, L. 7.) Based on the instructions the 
state renewed its motion in limine. (Tr., p. 180, L. 12 - p. 181, L. 9.) The 
defense argued that Payne's testimony that he intended to turn the 
methamphetamine over to police would be relevant to show the same immunity 
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conferred on police when they possess controlled substances for law 
enforcement purposes. (Tr., p. 181, L. 10 - p. 182, L. 8.) The district court 
rejected this asserted defense as unfounded, implicitly granting the state's 
motion to exclude evidence of motive. (Tr., p. 182, L. 9 - p. 184, L. 5.) 
At the trial Payne testified that he was driving when someone flashed his 
lights at him so he pulled over. (Tr., p. 196, Ls. 4-25.) That person expressed 
regret over the loss of Payne's go-cart and threw methamphetamine into Payne's 
car. (Tr., p. 196, Ls. 6-9; p. 197, L. 10 - p. 199, L. 20.) Payne testified he then 
drove straight to a police officer's house and turned the methamphetamine over 
to the officer. (Tr., p. 199, L. 21 - p. 201, L. 9; p. 202, L. 25 - p. 203, L. 8.) 
Payne also testified his motivation was to "just get [the methamphetamine) off the 
street" (Tr., p. 218, Ls. 10-15) and that he "just wanted it away from" him (Tr., p. 
222, Ls. 2-8). In closing argument the defense argued that Payne did not have 
intent to possess because his only intent was to turn over to the police the 
methamphetamine that had been thrown into his car. (Tr., p. 240, L. 6 - p. 242, 
L. 10.) 
The jury convicted Payne of possession of methamphetamine. (R., p. 48.) 
The district court entered judgment, suspending sentencing and placing Payne 
on probation. (R., pp. 59-66.) Payne thereafter filed a timely notice of appeal. 
(R., pp. 67-70.) 
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ISSUE 
Payne states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err when it failed to provide Mr. Payne a fair 
opportunity to present his complete defense? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 5.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Payne asserts for the first time on appeal that evidence of motive is 
always relevant or, alternatively, that his proposed testimony on his motive was 
relevant to a defense of mistake or accident. Has Payne failed to show 
fundamental error? 
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ARGUMENT 
Payne Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error 
A. Introduction 
Before the trial court Payne argued that his proposed testimony of motive 
for possessing methamphetamine was to establish that he had no intent to 
possess (Tr., p. 78, L. 16 - p. 79, L. 5; p. 80, Ls. 2-6; p. 85, Ls. 7-22; p. 87, Ls. 9-
12) or that he was entitled to the same immunity as law enforcement (Tr., p. 181, 
L. 10 - p. 182, L. 8). The district court rejected the validity of the asserted 
defense and implicitly found the evidence irrelevant. (Tr., p. 182, L. 9 - p. 184, L. 
5.) 
On appeal Payne contends that he was entitled to explain his motivations 
regardless of their relevance. (Appellant's brief, pp. 7-9.) He further claims he 
had an affirmative defense of misfortune or accident. (Appellant's brief, pp. 9-
10.) He made neither of these arguments below, however. Because he failed to 
preserve these arguments, Payne must show fundamental error, a burden he 
has not attempted to shoulder, much less actually demonstrate. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Relevance of evidence is reviewed de novo. State v. Gomez, 137 Idaho 
671, 674, 52 P.3d 315, 318 (2002); State v. Reid, 151 Idaho 80, 86, 253 P.3d 
754, 760 (Ct. App. 2011 ). 
"It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely 
objection must be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for appeal." 
State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000). Absent a 
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timely objection, the appellate courts of this state will only review an alleged error 
under the fundamental error doctrine. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227, 245 
P.3d 961, 979 (2010). 
C. Payne Has Shown No Fundamental Error In The Exclusion Of Evidence 
Of His Motive For Possessing Methamphetamine 
Whether a claim of error asserted for the first time on appeal is 
fundamental, and therefore subject to appellate decision, is reviewed using a 
three-part test: 
(1) the defendant must demonstrate that one or more of the 
defendant's unwaived constitutional rights were violated, (2) the 
error must be clear or obvious, without the need for any additional 
information not contained in the appellate record, including 
information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical 
decision; and (3) the defendant must demonstrate that the error 
affected the defendant's substantial rights meaning (in most 
instances) that it must have affected the outcome of the trial 
proceedings. 
Perry, 150 Idaho at 227, 245 P.3d at 978 (footnote omitted). Application of these 
standards to Payne's appellate arguments shows no fundamental error. 
As to the first prong, Payne has failed to demonstrate that "one or more" of 
his "unwaived constitutional rights were violated." Payne argues that he was 
denied his constitutional right to present a defense. (Appellant's brief, pp. 6-7.) 
He first argues that motive is always a defense. (Appellant's brief, pp. 7-9.) In 
the alternative he argues that his defense was misfortune or accident. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 9-10.) Neither of these arguments establishes 
unconstitutional denial of a defense in this case. 
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A defendant has a general right, rooted in the Compulsory Process or 
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, to offer testimony of witnesses, to compel their 
attendance, and to present the defendant's version of the facts. ~. 
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18-19 (1967); State v. Meister, 148 Idaho 
236, 220 P.3d 1055 (2009). This constitutional guarantee, however, does not 
afford a criminal defendant a right to present irrelevant evidence. Delaware v. 
Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986); United States v. Torres, 937 F.2d 1469, 
1473 (9th Cir. 1991); State v. Self, 139 Idaho 718,722, 85 P.3d 1117, 1121 (Ct. 
App. 2003); State v. Molen, 148 Idaho 950, 956-57, 231 P.3d 1047, 1053-54 (Ct. 
App. 2010). Payne failed to demonstrate that the evidence in question was 
relevant either to disprove the state's case or to prove any affirmative defense 
actually asserted by Payne at trial. 
The testimony of motive was not relevant to rebut the state's case. 
Evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that 
is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less 
probable than it would be without the evidence." I.R.E. 401; State v. Hocker, 115 
Idaho 544, 768 P.2d 807 (Ct. App. 1989). Possession of a controlled substance 
may be either actual or constructive. State v. Warden, 97 Idaho 752, 754, 554 
P.2d 684, 686 (1976). Actual possession requires possession and the 
knowledge that one is in possession of the substance. State v. Blake, 133 Idaho 
237, 240-241, 985 P.2d 117, 120-121 (1999). Constructive possession "exists 
where a nexus between the accused and the substance is sufficiently proven so 
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as to give rise to the reasonable inference that the accused was not simply a 
bystander but, rather, had the power and intent to exercise dominion and control 
over the substance." State v. Crawford, 130 Idaho 592, 595, 944 P.2d 727, 730 
(Ct. App. 1997). 
Evidence that Payne subjectively intended to turn the methamphetamine 
over to the police does not have any tendency to disprove his actual or 
constructive possession. Payne admitted knowledge that the package he 
possessed contained methamphetamine. (Tr., p. 207, L. 24 - p. 208, L. 8.) He 
also admitted knowing possession of the package. (Tr., p. 209, Ls. 3-5.) There 
was thus no dispute that, according to the legal definition, Payne was in actual 
possession of methamphetamine. Evidence that Payne subjectively wanted to 
deliver the methamphetamine to the police did not have a tendency to disprove 
his actual or constructive possession. The evidence was not relevant to rebut 
the state's evidence of actual and constructive possession, and therefore there 
was no constitutional right to present it. 
Payne does not argue on appeal that the evidence in question was 
relevant to rebut the state's case. Tellingly absent from his brief is any mention 
of the relevance standard under Idaho's rules of evidence and any discussion of 
the legal standards for proving actual possession. (Appellant's brief, pp. ii, 6-10.) 
Instead, Payne argues that there is a free-standing defense of proper motive. 
The cases he relies on do not support such a conclusion, however. 
In State v. Jones, 25 Idaho 587, 138 P. 1116 (1914) (cited in Appellant's 
brief, p. 7), the trial court prohibited the defendant in his embezzlement trial from 
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answering a question of whether he intended to defraud because such testimony 
was "a self-serving declaration." & at 603, 138 P. at 1121. The court held this 
was error because a defendant is competent to testify about motive or intention if 
those matters are "relevant to the issue." & Here the question is not Payne's 
competence to testify about his motive, but whether motive was relevant. Unlike 
Jones's lack of intent to defraud, Payne's motive for possession was not relevant 
to rebut the state's case. 
Payne next cites to State v. Givens, 28 Idaho 253, 152 P. 1054 (1915) 
(cited in Appellant's brief, p. 8), where the defendant was charged with making a 
false report of the financial condition of a state bank. The court stated that the 
prosecution had the burden of proving both that the defendant made a false 
report and that he knew the report was false. & at 263-64, 152 P. at 1056. The 
court then held that the trial court erred by excluding evidence that the defendant 
had orally clarified his written report to the bank commissioner because such 
would negate intent to deceive. & at 265-67, 152 P. at 1057. Again, this case 
stands only for the proposition that a defendant may offer relevant testimony 
tending to negate his guilt, not that he has an absolute right to explain his actions 
even though such explanation is not relevant to the mental state the state must 
prove. 
In State v. Hopple, 83 Idaho 55, 357 P.2d 656 (1960) (cited in Appellant's 
brief, pp. 8-9), the defendant was charged with grand larceny for steeling sheep. 
Citing the general rule that a defendant may testify to motive when such is 
relevant the court held that the trial court erred by prohibiting the defendant from 
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testifying that he corralled the sheep in question because he believed he had a 
right to do so to prevent the sheep, which had come on his property, from 
"tromping on my cattle feed." kl at 59-60, 357 P.2d at 658-59. Thus, the 
evidence in question was relevant to whether Hopple had felonious intent at the 
time of the taking. kl at 60, 357 P.2d 656. 
Payne has thus established by citation to authority that evidence of why 
an employee wrote out a check on his employer's account is relevant to whether 
the employee had intent to embezzle; evidence of whether a banker orally 
clarified a false report was relevant to whether he intended to deceive with the 
false report; and evidence of whether a rancher corralling sheep had intent to 
deprive the sheep from their owner is relevant to grand larceny. What Payne has 
failed to establish is that there is some free-floating constitutional right to testify to 
motive or that motive is always relevant, especially under the law applicable in 
this case (which goes unmentioned by Payne). In short, Payne has not shown 
that the evidence in question was relevant to rebut the state's allegation of 
possession of methamphetamine and has therefore failed to show he had a 
constitutional right to present it. 
In his alternative argument Payne asserts that the evidence was relevant 
to the affirmative defense of misfortune or accident. (Appellant's brief, pp. 9-10.) 
This affirmative defense applies whenever the crime is committed through 
misfortune or accident where there was no "evil design, intention or culpable 
negligence." I.C. § 18-201 (3). The state agrees that circumstances such as that 
alleged by Payne, where an otherwise innocent person accidentally or 
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unintentionally acquires possession of a controlled substance he or she does not 
want, falls within this defense. This defense was not raised at trial, however. At 
trial, the only affirmative defense proffered was a law enforcement exception, 
which was rejected by the trial court and is not asserted as a viable defense on 
appeal. At no point did the defense assert the affirmative defense of misfortune 
or accident, and in fact acceded to jury instructions not containing this affirmative 
defense. (Tr., p. 178, L 21 - p. 180, L. 7.) Because Payne did not raise this 
defense at trial, his claim that the trial court denied him this defense is without 
merit 
Because Payne has failed to establish any constitutional right to present 
evidence of his motivation under the facts and law applicable to this case, he has 
failed to show the first element of a fundamental error claim. 
Payne has also failed to meet the second prong of a fundamental error 
claim because he has not shown clear error. Because the evidence does not 
appear to be relevant to actual possession there is no clear error in the district 
court's holding. In addition, because Payne did not raise the defense of 
misfortune or accident to the trial court it is not clear that the trial court had any 
duty to determine the relevance of the evidence to the unasserted defense. 
Finally, there was no prejudice. To show prejudice under the fundamental 
error standard the "defendant must demonstrate that the error affected the 
defendant's substantial rights," generally by showing a reasonable probability 
that the error "affected the outcome of the trial court proceedings." Perry, 150 
Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. If the claim of error were preserved the inquiry 
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would be "whether, beyond a reasonable doubt, a rational jury would have 
convicted [the defendant] even without the admission of the challenged 
evidence." State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 669, 227 P.3d 918, 923 (2010) 
(citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)). Under either of these 
standards the error was harmless. 
At the trial Payne was allowed to testify that the methamphetamine came 
to him because some person he barely knew threw it into his car and that he 
immediately took the methamphetamine to the police. (Tr., p. 196, Ls. 4-25; p. 
197, L. 10 - p. 201, L. 9; p. 202, L. 25 - p. 203, L. 8.) More importantly, he 
testified that his motivation was to "just get [the methamphetamine] off the street" 
(Tr., p. 218, Ls. 10-15) and that he "just wanted it away from" him (Tr., p. 222, Ls. 
2-8), In closing Payne's attorney argued: 
So, what do we have here? We have the fact that this was 
methamphetamine, the fact that Troy presented it to Captain 
Barclay. We have Troy's sworn testimony that he had it for just a 
very few minutes before he came over to Captain Barclay's house 
and gave it to him. 
Now, Mr. Henkes talked about the various jury instructions, 
and he referred you to Instruction 11. I'm going to repeat that once 
more, just to make sure we got that right. "In every crime or public 
offense, there must exist a union or joint operation of act and intent. 
Intent does not mean an intent to commit a crime but merely the 
intent to knowingly perform the prohibited act." 
Now, in this case, the prohibited act is possession of 
methamphetamine. Did Troy have the intent to possess the 
methamphetamine? Did he have the intent to commit that 
particular act? I would submit to you that he didn't. 
The guy that threw it through his window threw it through his 
window without his permission and then took off immediately. He 
didn't get a chance to throw it back. 
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If Troy had taken this stuff and put it into a toilet and flushed 
it or thrown it into the dumpster, then, you know, he probably would 
not be before the court today. But he did what he had been taught 
as a kid, and he went to a police officer who he thought he could 
trust. And he brought that controlled substance or what he believed 
to be a controlled substance to the police officer, and the police 
officer then took it. 
But I do know that Troy, in the words of the second part of 
instruction No. 11, did not have the intent to commit a crime. He 
didn't have the intent to knowingly perform the prohibited act. He 
wanted to get rid of this stuff just as quickly as he possibly could. 
And Captain Barclay's home, he knew where that was. He knew 
he was a narcotics detective. And so he went there, and he turned 
it in, got it out of his own hands as quickly as he possibly could - in 
his testimony, just a few minutes after he obtained that from the guy 
in the white SUV. 
(Tr., p. 239, L. 25 - p. 242, L. 10 (emphasis added).) 
Whether Payne has the appellate burden of showing prejudice or the state 
has the burden of showing harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt, any error 
in the district court's ruling was harmless because Payne in fact testified to his 
motivation and such was argued to the jury. 
The district court held that evidence of Payne's motivation for his actual 
possession of methamphetamine was not relevant to rebut the state's evidence, 
a holding Payne does not challenge on appeal. Payne's claim that a criminal 
defendant has a constitutional right to present testimony about motive regardless 
of its relevance is without merit. Likewise, although the evidence was relevant to 
the affirmative defense of misfortune or accident, such affirmative defense was 
not asserted to the trial court and is therefore not a ground for finding error by the 
trial court. Finally, Payne ultimately did testify about his motive and such was 
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argued to the jury, so Payne was not prejudiced. For these reasons Payne has 
failed to show fundamental error in the district court's evidentiary ruling. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Payne's conviction for 
possession of methamphetamine. 
DATED this 29th day of March, 2012. 
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